But life is short, and truth works far and lives long: let us speak the truth.

--- Schopenhauer


2021. "Deflationary Theories of Properties and their Ontology", Australasian Journal of Philosophy PDF (published version)

We raise a problem for Hofweber's nominalist theory of properties. In its stead, we formulate a theory of properties in analogy to Horwich's minimalist theory of truth. Although this theory relies on the existence of abstract objects, we argue that it nevertheless appropriate to call the theory deflationary.

2021. "Is Deflationism Compatible with Compositional and Tarskian Truth Theories?", with Lavinia Picollo, in: C. Nicolai and J. Stern (eds.), Modes of truth. The unified approach to truth, modality, and paradox, Routledge, pp. 41-68 PDF (published version)

We argue that, contrary to received wisdom, deflationary theories of truth are compatible with Tarski-style axioms for truth.

2020. "Does Semantic Deflationism Entail Meta-Ontological Deflationism?", with Benjamin Marschall, Philosophical Quarterly PDF (published version)

In a recent paper, Amie Thomasson has argued that deflationism about truth and reference entails deflationism about existence which in turn entails meta-ontological deflationism, i.e. the view that the neo-Quinean approach to metaphysics is misguided. We argue that Thomasson's arguments fail.

2020. “A Note on Horwich’s Notion of Grounding”, Synthese 197: 2029-2038 PDF (published version)

I argue that Horwich's solution of the liar paradox doesn't work, and look at some alternatives.

2019. “Classes, Why and How”, Philosophical Studies 176: 407-435 PDF (published version)

I introduce a type-free theory of classes that admits a universal class, i.e. a class containing absolutely everything, including itself. I show that the theory allows us to reconstruct second-order arithmetic. Moreover, I argue that the theory provides a positive solution to the problem of absolutely unrestricted quantification.

2018. “Deflationism and the Function of Truth”, with Lavinia Picollo, Philosophical Perspectives 32: 326-351 PDF (published version)

We argue that the truth predicate is best understood as a means to simulate higher-order quantification in a first-order framework. Indeed, truth allows us to simulate full impredicative higher-order comprehension. We conclude from this that deflationary theories of truth do not have to be conservative.

2018. “Disquotation and Infinite Conjunctions”, with Lavinia Picollo, Erkenntnis 83: 899-928 PDF (published version)

Deflationists claim that the truth predicate exists solely for a certain logical function. However, what that function is has never been spelled out properly. We look at two accounts of spelling out that function and argue that they are unsatisfactory.

2018. “Some Notes on Truth and Comprehension”, Journal of Philosophical Logic 47: 449-479 PDF (published version)

This paper contains a systematic study of translations between the language of truth and languages that allow for second-order quantification.

2017. “A Graph-Theoretic Analysis of the Semantic Paradoxes”, with Timo Beringer, Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 23: 442-492 PDF (published version)

We investigate what reference patterns lead to semantic paradox by assigning reference graphs to sentences containing the truth predicate. We show that there two patterns underlying all paradoxes: the circle and the double path.

2016. “Reference Graphs and Semantic Paradox”, with Timo Beringer, in P. Arazim and M. Dancak (eds.), Logica Yearbook 2015, College Publications: London, pp. 1-15 PDF (preprint)

This paper provides a birds-eye view of our 2017 paper.

2016. “Arithmetic with Fusions”, with Jeff Ketland, Logique et Analyse 234: 207-226 PDF (penultimate version)

This paper investigates the proof-theoretic strength of classical mereology / fusion theory.

2015. “A Disquotational Theory of Truth as Strong as Z2-“, Journal of Philosophical Logic 44: 395-410 PDF (penultimate version)

This paper introduces a disquotational truth theory as strong as second-order arithmetic (without parameters).

2014. “La Paradoja de Cantor (Cantor’s Paradox)”, in E. Barrio (ed.), Paradojas, Paradojas y más Paradojas, College Publications: London, pp. 199-212 [in Spanish] PDF (English version)

A survey article on Cantor's paradox of the class of all classes.

2014. “Axioms for Grounded Truth”, The Review of Symbolic Logic 7: 73-83 PDF (revised and expanded version)

This paper introduces an axiomatic formulation of Leitgeb's theory of truth and alternative formulations of the Kripke-Feferman theory and Cantini's supervaluational theory.

Teaching material:

2018. “Set Theory ”, Lecture Notes, University of Cambridge, 40 pp.

2014. “Tarski Hierarchies, Grounded Truth, and Ramified Analysis”, Lecture Notes, University of Buenos Aires, 15 pp. PDF

2013. “Set Theory ”, with Catrin Campbell-Moore, Lecture Notes, LMU Munich, 53 pp. PDF


2013. Putnam's Model-theoretic Arguments”, The Reasoner 7: 84 PDF

2013. “Paradox and Truth”, with Catrin Campbell-Moore, The Reasoner 7: 84-85 PDF


2015. Type-free truth. LMU Munich. 161 pp. PDF

Me and frequent collaborateur, Lavinia Picollo

Mendoza, Argentina, 2014